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INTRODUCTION
Theempirical and theoretical analyses presented in this book dea.l
with a large number of specific issues, but two major analytical threads
run through the stUdy. The first concerns the articulation and testing of a
theory of urban housing markets that is somewhat different from that
which generally has been employed by economists for systematic empir-
ical analyses of urban housing markets. The second concerns analysis of
the effects of racial discrimination.
As we discuss in Chapter 2, economists, in their analyses of urban
housing markets, have relied on a highly abstract theory that requires a
large number of questionable simplifying assumptions. Some of these
assumptions may be of little consequence, but others color the analyses
in ways that may lead to seriously misleading conclusions. An important
feature of most previous systematic empirical studies of urban housing
markets is an insistence that housing can be analyzed as though it were a
homogeneous good, whose quantities are accurately measured by
households' total expenditures for housing. We do not doubt that this
view is suitable for the analysis of many problems, but it is necessary to
point out that there is a strong tendency to rely on this construct in
circumstances where it is inappropriate.
In this study, we have developed and used a considerably different
theoretical framework. It parts from traditional theories in two major
respects: its unusual emphasis on the heterogeneous nature of housing
services; and the important role assigned to specific workplace locations
in determining households' choices of housing bundles and where they
reside in large urban areas.
A large part of the analyses presented in this book is concerned with
the intrinsic problems of defining and measuring meaningful categories
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of housing output, with obtaining estimates of attribute prices, and with
analyzing the determinants of demand for housing services. Although
workplace location is a central element of the revised theory presented
in Chapter 2, it does not figure prominently in the empirical analyses
presented in subsequent chapters. In large part this is so because the
sample of 1,500 households which is the basis for most of the empirical
analyses presented in this book is not suitable for analysis of the effect of
workplace location on housing demand.
In Chapter 3 we present an extensive review of previous empirical
research on the effects of racial discrimination on urban housing markets
and extend the theory of urban housing markets presented in Chapter 2
to include the effects of racial discrimination. While our survey of
previous studies (many of which were done by sociologists rather than
by economists), our theorizing, and our empirical findings all indicate
that racial discrimination has major and pervasive effects in urban
housing markets, most systematic studies of urban housing markets
either ignore discrimination altogether or minimize its impact.
This chapter's recapitulation of the major findings of our research
reflects the two major threads initially adumbrated. In the first half, we
briefly review our principal findings about the nature of housing services
and the demand for a heterogeneous housing stock. Then, in the second
half, we summarize the findings of our empirical analyses as they relate
to the large and extensive effects of racial discrimination.
THENATURE OF HOUSING SERVICES
Mostearlier studies of urban housing markets and the demand for
housing services have treated housing as though it were a homogeneous
good, which could be measured by the household's aggregate expendi-
tures for housing. This view of the nature of housing services is based on
a long-run equilibrium theory of urban housing markets that assumes a
full adjustment of the stock of residential and nonresidential capital. This
theory ignores those aspects of the heterogeneity of housing services
that result from the extreme durability and immobility of housing capital
and considers only housing attributes that are produced by competitive
firms. Thus, in traditional empirical studies, the question of what deter-
mines the demand for housing services and the question of what deter-
mines housing expenditures are identical. In addition, empirical studies
of the demand for housing services generally have resorted to the ad hoc
practice of estimating separate demand functions for owner and renter
households. This reflects both the absence of suitable data on the
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theory of demand that includes both households' decisions to own or
rent, which are strongly influenced by investment considerations, and
household decisions about how much to spend on housing annually.
The empirical analyses presented in this book are motivated by a
view of urban housing markets that differs from this traditional one in a
number of important respects. First, as we discuss in Chapter 2, we
consider long-run equilibrium models to be of only limited usefulness in
the analysis of urban housing markets and would argue that economists
have placed too much reliance on them, both in analysis of urban
housing markets and in prescribing public policy. We feel that in making
policy proposals economists and noneconomists alike rely on these
theories or conclusions derived from them far more than is commonly
recognized.
The empirical analyses presented in this book clearly demonstrate
the deficiency of most earlier studies and the analytical and predictive
advantages of viewing housing as bundles of specific housing attributes.
Housing consumers must choose between a finite number of housing
bundles made up of specific quantities of various housing attributes.
Individuals can modify these bundles somewhat, but the scope for such
change is clearly limited. It is especially pertinent that many of these
housing attributes (including housing age, structure type, and lot size)
cannot be produced or modified at reasonable cost, and that many others
(including quality of local schools and the socioeconomic character of
neighborhoods) are not produced by competitive firms but, instead,
require some kind of collective action or the aggregation in some manner
of individual private decisions. Because housing capital and physical
environments are so durable and difficult to change, and because attri-
butes that are not provided by competitive firms may respond only
sluggishly to price differentials, many housing attributes earn quasi
rents. Moreover, the geographic pattern of these spatial quasi rents
varies among housing attributes and bundles, thereby affecting both the
type of housing selected by consumers and its location.
The empirical analyses of urban housing markets presented in
previous chapters are infused with this broader view of the nature of
housing services and prices and its implications for the analysis of
housing demand. These empirical analyses deal with several major
questions: (1) The definition of housing attributes and housing bundles
and the estimation of the price of housing attributes (analyses of these
questions are important in their own right, but in addition our constructs
are used in subsequent analyses of the demand for housing); (2) determi-
nants of total housing expenditures; (3) household decisions to move or
change their residences and the closely related decision to rent or
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housing attributes and the demand for categories of relatively homogene-
ous attributes.
DETERMINANTSOF ATTRIBUTE PRICES
Accessibilityto employment centers is the only determinant of
spatial variations in housing prices included in traditional economic
models of residential location and urban spatial structure. In contrast,
the results presented in Chapter 8 suggest that the spatial distribution of
the supply of housing bundles may have an even greater influence upon
location rents than does accessibility to the core of the metropolitan
area. If this apparent result is correct, it implies that the timing of
residential development is a far more important determinant of the shape
of metropolitan location rent surfaces than most previous studies
acknowledge. The historical distribution of stocks of particular housing
capital, which adjusts only slowly to changes in incomes, workplaces,
and tastes, clearly exerts far more influence on metropolitan surfaces of
housing prices than traditional economic theories of urban spatial struc-
ture would indicate.
The analysis presented in Chapter 8 (and in the related Appendix F)
attempts to measure the attributes of housing services and to impute
market prices to these attributes. For rental properties, the quality of
dwelling units is measured by two indexes of the quality of the interior
and exterior of the units: by the presence of hot water and central
heating and by the age of the structure. The size of dwelling units is
measured by the number of rooms and bathrooms and a prorated share
of the parcel area associated with the structure. The quality of neighbor-
hoods is measured by indexes of the quality of adjacent structures and of
the block face as a whole, by a surrogate for neighborhood prestige (the
median schooling of adults in the census tract), and measures of school
quality and criminal activity (for the subset of city properties).
In regressions relating the contract rent of these units to these
measures of housing services, six dummy variables are also included for
structure type, four dummy variables reflect the terms of the rental
contract (whether it includes landlord provision of heat, water, furniture,
or major appliances), and two additional variables (duration of occu-
pancy and a dummy variable for resident landlords) are incorporated.
For owner-occupied single detached units, the description also includes
the first-floor area of the structure.
The results of the analysis indicate that between 71 and 77 percent
of the variance in housing prices and contract rents can be explained by
these attributes of residential housing services. In particular, most of theMajor Findings on the Structure of Urban Housing Markets 287
measuresof quality included in the models in Chapter 8 and in Appendix
F are strongly related to market prices. In comparison with the value of
these heterogeneous components Of housing services, the independent
contribution to housing price determination provided by accessibility is
modest.
Indeed, if the findings on the determinants of the value of housing
attributes presented in Chapter 8 were accepted uncritically, they would
seem to indicate that accessibility to employment has little or no effect
on housing values and rents. Specifically, these empirical analyses
reveal very little systematic spatial variation in housing prices that
cannot be explained by characteristics of the housing stock and the
spatial distribution of other housing attributes. This apparent contradic-
tion between our findings and the relationship predicted by economic
theories of urban spatial structure is resolved in part by theoretical and
empirical analyses presented in Chapters 2 and 8, which suggest that
there are in existence distinct location rent surfaces for individual hous-
ing attributes, subsets of housing attributes, and entire housing bundles,
rather than a single surface. Sample limitations make a definitive test of
this hypothesis impossible, but when the samples of housing units are
stratified by ghetto/nonghetto or by number of rooms, accessibility to
employment appears more important.
DETERMINANTSOF HOUSING EXPENDITURES
InChapter 7 we present a large number of conventional housing-
expenditure models estimated from a sample of approximately 1,500 St.
Louis households. These models, which follow the usual convention of
estimating separate equations for owner and renter households, explain-
a large fraction of the total variance in monthly rent and in the market
value of owner-occupied single-family homes. As in most earlier studies,
one one-hundredth of market value is used to proxy the monthly housing
expense of homeowners.
Two kinds of housing expenditure or housing demand equations are
presented in Chapter 7. The first of these, which we term the full model
of housing expenditures, includes 18 independent variables that describe
the socioeconomic-demographic characteristics of the household and its
members. These include variables that describe the race, education, and
age of the head of household, and the annual income, labor-force
participation, and size and composition of the household. In addition,
the rental equation includes four variables to measure differences in
contract terms, i.e., whether various utilities are provided by the land-
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about what statistical specification was most appropriate for these
expenditure models, we followed the common practice of obtaining
alternative estimates using linear, semilog, and log-log specifications of
each equation.
Although the several equations revealed individual differences, the
estimates were generally consistent and, in all but a few instances, the
coefficients of the individual explanatory variables had the correct signs
and were reasonable in magnitude. To give one example, the measure of
job stability used in these analyses indicates that housing outlays by
owners increase as years on the current job increase, but as would be
expected, the same variable has no discernible effect on housing expen-
ditures by renters. The effect of job stability is enhanced by the finding
that owners spend substantially more than renters with the same socio-
economic-demographic characteristics and that years on the currentjob
has a large effect on the probability of a household owning its home. The
analysis also provides evidence of a lagged adjustment of retired home-
owners to their smaller family responsibilities and lower incomes. For
example, the semilog model indicates that retired owners spend 13
percent more on housing than would be expected, given their incomes
and household characteristics. No comparable effect is obtained for
retired renters.
The models of housing expenditure referred to above include a
richer description of the characteristics of individual households than is
typically included in econometric studies of the demand for housing. To
make it easier to compare our findings with those of earlier studies, we
estimated a number of models that focused more narrowly on the
relation between household income and housing expenditures by owner
and renter households. These simple models obtain some results that are
consistent with earlier studies and some that contradict them. To illus-
trate, our analyses confirm the finding of all previous studies that the
income elasticity of housing expenditure is larger for owners than for
renters. At the same time, our estimated income elasticities for both
owners and renters are much less than the value of one that several other
researchers have proposed as the correct value of the income elasticity
of demand for housing. In this respect, our estimates more closely
resemble the estimates obtained from recent studies based on microdata
than those earlier studies based on aggregate data.
Because of the substantial evidence that housing-market discrimina-
tion has a substantial effect on black housing expenditures, we estimated
separate expenditure relations for black and white households. The
important differences revealed by these analyses are discussed in the
second half of this chapter. In addition, we estimated some simple
expenditure equations, using an estimate of permanent income. TheseMajor Findings on the Structure of Urban Housing Markets 289
estimates produced a modest increase in the income elasticity of housing
demand, but it still remained much less than one for all specifications.
The elasticity of housing expenditures with respect to permanent income
obtained for the log-log equation was .43 for white renters and .46 for
white owner-occupants of single-family homes.
TENURECHOICE AND MOBILITY
Thereare two major ways of obtaining housing services. Roughly
63 percent of U.S. households in 1970 lived in rental units, while 37
percent lived in owner-occupied dwellings. Renters pay a specified
weekly or monthly amount, have limited rights of tenure, and neither
benefit nor lose from increases or decreases in the value of the property.
Owner-occupants, by contrast, purchase their dwellings, either outright
or with the assistance of a mortgage, may continue to occupy the unit for
as long as they wish, and suffer capital gains or losses if their property
increases or decreases in value. In addition to their initial payment at the
time of purchase, owner-occupants must generally make periodic pay-
ments for maintenance, utilities, property taxes, and, if they purchased
their home with a mortgage, for interest on, and amortization of, their
mortgage.
It is difficult tO compare housing expenditures by owners and
renters for two major reasons. First, there is very little information
available on actual housing expenditures by owner—occupants. As a
result, most studies of housing demand by owner-occupants use either
property values or some fraction of the value of the unit to proxy the
quantity of housing consumed and housing expenditure. Worse still,
even if detailed data on actual housing expenditures by owners were
available, they would be difficult to interpret because of the question of
how unrealized capital gains should be evaluated. The investment con-
siderations of ownership decisions are probably the most important
ones. In addition, however, control over tenure may be important to
many households, especially those with children; and differences in the
supply of rental and owner-occupied units may virtually force house-
holds with strong preferences for particular housing bundles to own or
rent.
These issues are considered in Chapter 5, which presents analyses
of household decisions to own, to purchase, and to change residence.
The models of mobility, home ownership, and home purchase use the
same explanatory variables that are included in the complex housing
expenditure models presented in Chapter 7. This presentation does not
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demand, but it does provide a consistent way of analyzing the effects of
these several socioeconomic-demographic variables on household deci-
sions to own or to rent and on the separate decisions of how much
owners and renters of various characteristics will spend on housing.
The results of the home ownership analysis are generally consistent
with the findings of earlier studies; the probability of being a homeowner
is strongly affected by family composition and is much less dependent on
household income. Small households, and especially those that do not
inëlude children, are much less likely to be homeowners than larger
ones. Retired households are far more likely to be homeowners than
would be predicted on the basis of their current incomes and household
composition.
Not surprisingly, the findings for the decision to purchase resemble
those for the ownership analysis in most respects. The effect of house-
hold income on the probability of purchase is virtually the same as its
effect on the probability of home ownership. Prior tenure also has a large
effect on the probability of purchase: the probability of house purchase
is .23 higher for prior owners than for prior renters and .42 greater than
for new households. The average probability of purchase over the three-
year period considered in the analysis was .22.
Tenure similarly has an important effect on the rate of mobility of
urban hoUseholds. The simple mobility rates, which combine the inde-
pendènt effects of tenure per se and differences in the socioeconomic-
demographic characteristics of owners and renters, indicate that 12
percent of owner-occupants included in the sample move within a three-
year period as contrasted with 38 percent of renters. The mobility
equations similarly indicate that after the effects of all other socioeco-
nomic variables are accounted for, prior renters were .20 less likely to
move and prior owners were .40 less likely to move than both new
households and households who did not report their prior tenure. This
analysis also reveals that households with retired heads are much less
likely to move than otherwise comparable households whose heads are
employed; the presence of multiple wage earners in the household like-
wise reduces the rate of mobility.
DEMANDFOR A HETEROGENEOUS HOUSING
STOCK
Theconventional housing-expenditure demand models presented in
Chapter 7 are a useful base line against which to compare the analyses of
demand for heterogeneous parts of housing output which constitute a
large part of the empirical analyses presented by us. The analyses of theMajor Findings on the Structure of Urban Housing Markets 291
demand for separable dimensions of housing output employ two distinct
methods of analysis. First, in Chapter 9, we present single-equation
attribute demand equations estimated by ordinary least-squares for
twenty-one individual housing attributes. These include five measures of
dwelling-unit quality and amenity, four measures of dwelling-unit and
parcel size, seven variables that describe the quality of the neighborhood
and the government services provided, and five structure types.
Because these attribute demand equations are defined in physical
terms, it is possible to combine the owner and renter subsamples and
estimate pooled equations. Inasmuch as the demand of both renters and
owner-occupants is treated in a single unified demand relation, this
convention avoids the difficulty commonly encountered in the estima-
tion of expenditure housing-demand models. At the same time, to
facilitate evaluation of the interrelationship between tenure choice and
the demand for specific housing attributes, estimates are obtained for
separate attribute demand equations. These separate estimates for the
occupants of single-family owner-occupied units and renters are pre-
sented in Appendix 0. The pooled attribute demand equations also
include an important group of housing consumers which is omitted from
most studies of housing demand—the owner-occupants of multifamily
structures.
It is impossible to provide a complete summary of the specific
findings obtained for the large number of attribute demand equations.
Still, it is possible to indicate the broad outline of a few of the more
important results. Higher incomes, more years of education, and retire-
ment are all associated with the choice of larger dwellings and parcels
and with the increased household demand for the several attributes used
to represent dwelling-unit quality and neighborhood amenities. Simi-
larly, a positive, though weak, relationship is obtained between these
household characteristics and the consumption of public service attri-
butes, i.e., measures of school quality and neighborhood safety (low
crime rates). We attribute the weak relationship obtained more to the
measurement error of these attributes (and to the omission of suburban
observations) than to any clear-cut empirical regularities.
The effects of family size and composition on the consumption of
dwelling-unit quality, dwelling-unit size, and neighborhood quality are
both quite consistent and plausible a priori. The family-size variables
used in the attribute demand equations point to a clear pattern of
substitution of dwelling-unit size for dwelling-unit quality. Parcel area
behaves more like a quality variable than a dwelling-unit size variable;
its attribute demand equation indicates that a six-person family con-
sumes 1,428 fewer square feet of parcel area than a three-person family,
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are accounted for. At the same time, the results indicate that single
individuals and couples also consume much less exterior space than
otherwise comparable households. For example, young single males
consume 7,000 square feet less parcel area than the typical family. At the
same time, household consumption of exterior space increases rapidly
with income.
In addition to the attribute demand equations, we also estimated
demand equations for four categories of relatively homogeneous attri-
butes. These categories were defined both on the basis of a priori
theorizing and from analysis of the attribute demand equations. The
quantities of housing services which we included in the four categories of
attributes were computed by multiplying attribute price weights obtained
from hedonic price equations for nonghetto rental units by the quantity
of each attribute associated with each housing bundle and by summing
these for each of the four categories. Since rental prices were used for
both owner-occupied and renter-occupied units, these bundle-com-
ponent demand equations were also estimated for pooled samples of
owner and renter households.
We had two reasons for estimating the component demand equa-
tions, one conceptual, one pragmatic. First, on conceptual grounds we
were concerned about certain kinds of interdependence in the demand
for, and consumption of, and production of, housing attributes. Second,
we thought that estimation of a smaller number of demand relationships
for only four categories of relatively homogeneous attributes might
facilitate the analysis and reveal the• predominant relationships more
clearly.
We attempted to deal with the problem of interdependence through
use of a method of joint estimation first proposed by Arnold Zellner. As
it turned out, the empirical results revealed very little of the kind of
conjectured interdependence that originally led us to emplOy the tech-
nique. The benefits from aggregation in terms of simplifying the analysis
were somewhat greater. Our findings pertaining to the effects of house-
hol.d income, family composition, and retirement illustrate the results
obtained.
Evaluation of the equations presented in Chapter 10 reveals that a
$5,000 increase in income would lead to a 15 percent increase in dwell-
ing-unit quality, a 9.3 percent increase in interior space, a 3.2 percent
increase in neighborhood quality, and a 73.8 percent increase in exterior
space. The analyses also indicated that the addition of an infant to a
standard family would increase a household's demand fOr interior space
by 1.4 percent and the addition Of a child 5yearsof age would
increase its demand for interior space by 4.3 percent, while the addition
of another adult would increase its demand for interior space by only .3Major Findings on the Struciure of Urban Housing Markets 293
percent. Moreover, we find that single females consume 6.5 percent less
interior space, single males 7.8 percent less interior space, and couples
6.8 percent less interior space than otherwise comparable standard
families. These analyses further revealed that retired households con-
sumed 37 percent more dwelling quality, 5 percent more neighborhood
quality, and 19 percent more exterior space than would have been
predicted on the basis of their incomes, labor-force attachments, and
family composition. At the same time, the analysis revealed no signifi-
cant effect of retirement on the consumption of interior space.
IMPLICATIONSOF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Traditionaleconomic theories of urban housing markets ignore or
minimize the importance of housing-market discrimination. In Chapter 3
we extend the revised theory of urban housing markets developed in
Chapter 2 to incorporate the effects of racial discrimination. This analy-
sis explains the persistence of black ghettos in American cities in terms
of a modified theory of consumer behavior which acknowledges a
variety of constraints on black households. Chapter 3 also provides a
systematic review of previous empirical studies on the extent and causes
of residential segregation and of the economic costs it imposes on black
households.
The empirical analyses presented in Chapters 5 through 10 provide
highly consistent evidence of the effects of housing-market discrimina-
tion on house values and rents in the ghetto and in the remainder of the
metropolitan area, and its effects on housing consumption of black and
white households in St. Louis and a number of other metropolitan areas.
These findings, the theoretical framework developed in Chapters 2 and
3, and the systematic review of earlier studies presented in Chapter 3
provide a basis for a fairly comprehensive evaluation of the effects of
housing-market discrimination on the welfare of white and black Ameri-
cans and on the efficiency of metropolitan growth. Since we regard
these findings and their implications as the major substantative contri-
bution of this book, we devote the remainder of this final chapter to
summarizing them.
InsOfar as economists have considered housing-market discrimina-
tion at all, they have generally asked only whether housing-market
discrimination causes black households to pay more than white house-
holds for identical bundles of housing services. Even to this apparently
simple question, a definitive answer is elusive because of the inherent
methodological questions it involves. However, there is now general
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survey of previous studies presented in Chapter 3, that blacks typically
pay more than whites for the same housing bundles. These discrimina-
tion markups appear to be higher in areas with larger and more rapidly
growing black populations and in areas where black populations are
restricted to the central city. There is some indication, however, that
these differentials may have declined in recent years.
Our results for St. Louis suggest that black renters may pay prices
which are 12 to 18 percent higher than whites for comparable housing; at
any rate, housing units located in the ghetto cost this much more than
comparable units in the white submarket. For owners, the correspond-
ing analysis suggests a markup of 5to6 percent.
Discrimination markups of the magnitude identified for St. Louis
blacks in this book represent serious welfare losses for black Americans,
but they are only the tip of the iceberg. Nearly all available estimates of
discrimination markups implicitly assume that housing is a homogeneous
good and that housing in the ghetto is the same as housing outside the
ghetto, except for price. In fact, as we clearly demonstrate in earlier
chapters, housing is a bundle of heterogeneous attributes, the character-
istics of housing bundles available in the ghetto differ from those availa-
ble in the rest of the metropolitan housing market, and the discrimination
markups of these numerous housing bundles or attributes are not uni-
form.
Using a methodology based on microdata, and taking into consider-
ation the external and neighborhood aspects of housing services, we
obtain a variety of estimates of discrimination markups, all of which
suggest the presence of a substantial premium for owner and renter units
in the ghetto, at least in St. Louis, Missouri, in 1967. These estimates
are not inconsistent with the literature surveyed in Chapter 3. However,
when we take the heterogeneity of housing markets into account, the
estimated welfare loss is much larger.
This is the case because many desirable housing bundles are either
very scarce or completely unavailable in the ghetto. To consume these
desirabl.e kinds of housing, black households have to seek housing in
neighborhoods not sanctioned for black occupancy. There, without
guarantee of success, they must devote inordinate amounts of time and
money to house hunting. As a result, most blacks limit their search for
housing to the ghetto. Housing-market discrimination thus operates to
restrict black access to the newest, highest-quality housing in the best
neighborhoods. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that black households
consume less neighborhood quality, dwelling-unit quality, and exterior
space, and also spend less on housing than would be predicted from a
knowledge of their incomes and other characteristics (Chapters 9 and
10).Major Findings on the Structure of Urban Housing Markets 295
These same supply restrictions insure that blacks are much less
likely to be homeowners than are white households of similar income
and family structure. For example, our analysis of home ownership and
purchase in Chapter 5 revealed that while only 32 percent of black
households in St. Louis were homeowners, 41 percent would have been
homeowners if their housing-market behavior was the same as compara-
ble white households. The effect of these differences in black behavior
on the decision of recent movers to buy or rent was even larger. The
analyses of this decision presented in Chapter 5 revealed that while only
8 percent of St. Louis black households who had moved in the past three
years purchased homes, 20 percent would have been home buyers had
they been white.
Even larger differences between the actual and "expected" rates of
black home ownership were obtained for a number of other large metro-
politan areas. Analyses of the effects of racial discrimination in 18
large metropolitan areas presented in Chapter 6 reveal substantial
differences in black and white home ownership rates after adjusting for
socioeconomic differences. For example, while only 18 percent of
Chicago black households were homeowners, 47 percent would
have been homeowners in the absence of housing-market discrimina-
tion. The differences between actual and "expected" black ownership
rates among these 18 areas appear to be related systematically to the
extent to which the central-city ghetto contained units suitable for owner
occupancy and the extent of black access to suburban housing. This
finding is especially important in distinguishing between the several
hypotheses that could be advanced to "explain" the differences in the
housing consumption of otherwise comparable white and black house-
holds revealed by the various analyses presented in earlier chapters.
Restrictions on black home ownership opportunities have far
greater ramifications than may be evident at first glance. As we demon-
strate in Chapter 6, effective limitation on home ownership can increase
housing costs by over 30 percent, assuming no price appreciation.
Moreover, given reasonable assumptions about increases in housing
prices, a black household prevented from buying a home in 1950 would
have out-of-pocket housing costs in 1970 more than twice as high as such
costs would have been if the family had purchased a home twenty years
earlier. These increases in housing costs are in addition to any discrimi-
nation price markups.
Of course, much of the savings from home ownership results from
the favorable treatment accorded homeowners under federal income tax
laws. Since black households at all income levels purchase and own
fewer single-family homes than comparable whites, they are prevented
from taking full advantage of these tax benefits. The loss of tax benefits296 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
is greatest for middle- and upper-income black households, since tax
savings from home ownership increase with income.
Both the simple and more complex models of housing expenditure
presented in Chapter 7 indicate that black owners and renters spend
considerably less than white households with similar incomes, family
structure, and labor-force attachment. This difference, which is espe-
cially large for owners, provides important evidence relating to the
effects of discriminatory pricing upon households. Accepting the view of
previous studies that housing consumption is price elastic, the lower
levels of housing consumption by black owners and renters in St. Louis
are consistent with the findings presented in Chapter 8 that housing in
the ghetto is more expensive than comparable housing outside the
ghetto. We conclude that lower levels of housing consumption by black
households than by white households of comparable characteristics
reflect limitations on the supply of housing available to black house-
holds, which discourage them from buying as much housing as their
incomes and family circumstances dictate.
As we discuss in Chapters 6 and 7, the lower level of housing
consumption and lower levels of home ownership by black households
than by white households may be attributable in part to differences in the
"permanent income" of black and white households having otherwise
identical socioeconomic characteristics and annual incomes. However,
tests of this "permanent income" hypothesis as an explanation of black-
white differences in home ownership, home purchase, and the level of
housing expenditures presented in Chapters 6 and 7 indicate that sub-
stantial racial differences remain after adjusting for permanent income.
In addition, it might be argued that some of our empirical results
reflect unmeasured differences in the "tastes" of comparable black and
white households. As we discuss at several points in earlier chapters, we
do not find this argument very plausible as an explanation of our findings
of differences in housing consumption by black and white households.
The statistical models used to analyze black and white housing choices
include most of the variables that are believed to determine "tastes" for
housing, such as household income, the education and labor-force
attachment of its members, the job stability and age of the head, family
composition, and life cycle. The effect of these variables on black
housing choices is generally quite similar to their effects on white
housing choices, and the well-documented differences in the characteris-
tics of the housing supply within the ghetto and outside, and the diffi-
culty and expense of providing certain housing attributes in the ghetto,
provide a far more consistent explanation of black-white differences
than vague appeals to black-white differences in tastes for housing
consumption.Major Findings on the Structure of Urban Housing Markets 297
It is also important to emphasize that a difference in "tastes"
hypothesis cannot explain the measured differences in housing prices
inside and outside the ghetto. It would, moreover, take a decidedly
peculiar black-white difference in "tastes" among cities for this hypoth-
esis to explain the results of the intercity analysis presented in Chapter 6.
Our interpretation of these empirical findings is further supported by a
large number of qualitative studies and accounts of the problems
encountered by black households in attempting to acquire housing out-
side the ghetto and by attitudinal surveys, which indicate that only a
small fraction of black persons prefer segregated neighborhoods and that
an overwhelming majority would like to move out of the ghetto. These
studies are reviewed in Chapter 3.
Taken as a whole, the empirical findings presented in previous
chapters on the differences in housing expenditures and type of housing
consumption between comparable black and white households appear to
be most consistent with the hypothesis that housing-market discrimina-
tion seriously limits the residential location choices of black households
and effectively restricts the supply of housing—particularly certain
housing attributes or bundles—available to them. Our analysis indicates
that these supply restrictions are reflected in the unavailability of units
suitable for owner occupancy, in the dearth of high-quality dwelling
units, and in the discriminatory markups for both owner- and renter-
occupied units in the ghetto.
As we remarked earlier, several studies have provided evidence
that the demand for housing is price elastic. Thus, our finding in Chapter
7 that black households in St. Louis devote fewer resources to housing
than comparable white households appears to reflect rational decisions
of black housing consumers in a constrained housing market rather than
elusive differences in "tastes" between black and white consumers. Still
other results relating to the different choices of comparable black and
white households in the level of housing consumption, among housing
attributes and housing bundles, and between rental and owner-occupied
units (Chapters 5, 6, 9, 10) seem most consistent with the hypothesis that
black households are restricted in their access to the entire metropolitan
housing market and thus concentrate their search to a limited segment.
INDIRECTEFFECTS ON BLACK HOUSEHOLDS
Restrictionson black access to home ownership may explain in part
why black households at every income level have less wealth than white
households. A simple example, which is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 6, demonstrates the substantial effect of home ownership on298 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
capital accumulation by low- and middle-income households. The aver-
age house purchased with an FHA 203 mortgage in 1949 had a value of
$8,286 and a mortgage of $7,101. If this home had been purchased with a
twenty-year mortgage by a thirty-year-old household head, and if the
home neither appreciated or depreciated, the purchaser would have
saved more than seven-thousand dollars and would have owned his
home free and clear by his fiftieth birthday. Further, if we assume that
the price of this single-family home increased by a conservative two and
one-half percent per year, the purchaser would have accumulated assets
by age fifty worth at least $16,000, a considerable sum that he could use
to reduce his housing costs, to borrow against for the college education
of his children, or simply hold for his retirement.
The full effects of housing-market discrimination extend far beyond
housing and include additional, more subtle costs and welfare losses for
the black population. There is considerable evidence that segregated
housing patterns create unequal educational opportunity, increase insur-
ance and other living costs, and contribute to employment discrimina-
tion for blacks (as discussed in Chapter 3).
Dc facto segregation, rooted in racial discrimination in urban hous-
ing markets, has displaced de jure segregation as the principal cause of
segregated education and the inferior quality it typically signifies. Again
it is middle-class and upwardly mobile blacks, who wish their children to
have the best education possible, who suffer most from existing patterns
of segregated education.
Blacks who buy homes in the ghetto either are forced to pay more
for theft and fire insurance than would be the cost in suburban communi-
ties or are unable to obtain coverage at all. Mortgage financing is more
difficult to obtain and often can be had only on less favorable terms than
in the suburbs. These premiums are in addition to the discrimination
markups and home ownership considerations discussed previously.
Ghetto residents, moreover, usually pay more for auto insurance than
suburban whites. Even if these increased costs are appropriate to higher
risks, there is less opportunity for blacks to avoid them.
Housing segregation and discrimination reinforce more direct forms
of employment discrimination. Geographic limitations on the residential
choice of nonwhites insure that blacks can reach many jobs only by
time-consuming and expensive commuting. If blacks seek, obtain, and
accept these distant jobs, their real wages (money wages minus the
money and time outlays for commuting) will be less than those of
comparable white workers. Often blacks will not even learn of available
jobs far from the ghetto or will not bother to apply because of the cost
and difficulty of reaching them. Faced with these obstacles, they may
accept low-paying jobs near the. ghetto or no job at all, choosing leisureMajor Findings on the Structure of Urban Housing Markets 299
and weffare payments as rational alternatives to low net pay and circui-
tous transport.
Racial discrimination and the steady growth of central-city ghettos
have altered the patterns of urban growth and development in recent
decades. For example, if the suburbs had been open to middle- and low-
income blacks, many would almost certainly have moved to suburban
areas along with their jobs, much in the fashion of whites of similar
socioeconomic status. This suburbanization of blacks, though possibly
in clusters, would have occurred even if one maintains that blacks prefer
to live near other blacks.
Black access to the suburbs would have affected the central-city
housing market in two ways. First, a slower rate of growth of the
poverty population would have made central-city residential areas more
attractive to middle- and upper-income families. If more middle- and
high-income families had remained in the central cities, the quality of
public schools and of other public services would have been maintained
at higher levels, and the quality of neighborhood environments would
have declined less often. Second, a larger number of black suburban
residents would have increased the competition for, and the prices of,
suburban housing and would have reduced the competition for, and
prices of, central-city properties. Given relatively lower central-city
housing prices, many more centrally employed whites would have
decided to live in the central city. Similarly, few blacks employed at
suburban workplaces would commute long distances back to the central-
city core to pay more for housing. Increased black residence in the
suburbs also would have reduced the underreprésentation of blacks in
suburban
Unfortunately, the poverty of entrapped minority and other disad-
vantaged populations insured that central-city housing would worsen.
The result has been a steady expansion of slum housing, deterioration of
urban services, and an expectation that the process will continue until
many central cities become black slums. This pattern of urban develop-
ment presents us with the current policy dilemma: Can these historical
trends be reversed or is the economic, physical, and social decline of our
great cities inevitable?
SOMECONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Althoughblack Americans remain intensely segregated, there are
some indications that increasing numbers of black households are mov-
ing to the suburbs. The extent and nature of this suburbanization has not
yet been well documented. Much of the growth of black suburban300 HOUSING MARKETS AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
populations no doubt merely reflects the continued peripheral growth of
central-city ghettos across city borders. However, in many cases it may
significantly ease the supply restraints identified in earlier chapters, and
in some instances may actually represent genuine dispersal. A full
evaluation of these changes and their implications must await more
detailed analyses, but the limited evidence available suggests that the
forces of housing discrimination in a number of metropolitan areas may
be waning. At the same time, other metropolitan areas, particularly
those in the South, may be becoming more segregated. Historically,
southern metropolitan areas, particularly older ones, did not exhibit the
massive concentration of black households which characterized north-
ern metropolitan areas. Unfortunately, these southern cities appear to be
developing patterns of racial segregation similar to those found in the
North.
Qualitative changes in recent decades in the nature of the forces that
maintain housing-market segregation provide some basis for optimism.
A few years ago, government actively supported and maintained segre-
gated living The most effective weapons for the maintenance of
segregation—for example, racial covenants and FHA mortgage loan
policies—are no longer available. Racial discrimination in urban housing
markets is now unlawful and the federal government and numerous state
and local governments have promulgated a number of important regula-
tions that would limit the ability of lenders, brokers, sellers, property
owners, and developers to discriminate against minorities.
These changes in law and in government policy and practice reflect
long-term trends in the attitudes of the American population toward
racial discrimination. Whereas a short time ago an individual who openly
discriminated in housing could expect strong vocal approval from his
friends and neighbors, today he often will feel obliged to hide his actions
and motives. Brokers, who once openly refused to serve blacks, must
now disguise their discriminatory actions. Because of changes in law and
community attitudes, brokers are increasingly willing to show property
in white neighborhoods to black households.
Because racial prejudice persists and because discriminatory acts in
urban housing markets are so difficult to detect and prove, policies that
insure that minority households have access to the entire metropolitan
housing market on an equal basis with the white majority will be very
difficult to formulate. It would be irresponsible to design and implement
housing programs and policies that depend on minority access to the
entire housing market without a sober evaluation of the likelihood of
breaching the barriers which currently limit the housing choices of
minority households. The task is clearly a difficult and demanding one.
However, the fruits of success would be immense.